not by lack of means.
(2) To lack money is to suffer not (liability to) interference, but lack of means. So (3) Poverty (lack of money) does not carry with it lack of freedom.
The conclusion of the first movement of the argument, proposition (3), is a conceptual claim, a claim about how certain concepts are connected with one another. But, in the right's hands, that conceptual conclusion is used to support a normative claim, a claim about what ought to be done, which is reached as follows, in the second movement of the argument:
The conclusion of this argument follows from its three premisses, to wit, (1), (2) and (4). There are, accordingly, only three ways of resisting the argument. A familiar form of leftwing resistance to it challenges proposition (1), by asking how a person can reasonably be said to be free to do what she is unable to do? Another left-wing way of resisting the argument, also employed, as we have seen, by Berlin and Rawls, is to deny (4), by saying: even if lack of money is just lack of means, lack of means is just as confining as lack of freedom, and, therefore, just as important a thing for the state to rectify. I shall not resist the argument in either of those ways in the body of this paper, which is not to say that I disagree with those who resist either premiss (1) or premiss (4). I am not disagreeing with them, or agreeing with them, in the present paper, but simply shelving challenges to (1) and (4) here 8 In section 2, I attempt a refutation of proposition (2). I argue that to lack money is indeed to be prey to interference. If that argument is sound, then proposition (3) is false, if, as . Instead, I shall reject premiss (2), a premiss which, so far as I know, has not been resisted in the relevant literature. I believe that the non-standard resistance to the argument that I deploy here is more powerful, because it meets the right on their own conceptual ground.
The rest of this article has seven sections. In section 1, I show that the conceptual part of the right-wing argument has penetrated academic thought which cannot be described as right-wing. Isaiah Berlin and John Rawls, in particular, and their many followers, have advocated the conceptual part of the right-wing argument, which culminates in (3), even though, because they do not accept (4), they have not endorsed the right's normative conclusion, (5). 8 (1) I deal with (1) in the Addendum advertised at footnote 10 below.
(3) Poverty (lack of money) does not carry with it lack of freedom. (4) The primary task of government is to protect freedom. So (5) Relief of poverty is not part of the primary task of government.
the right insist, proposition (1) is true, since, if (1) is true, then the falsehood of (2) entails that (3) is false. I believe, moreover, that my argument, if sound, also establishes that proposition (3) is false whether or not (1) is true, since I cannot imagine how anyone who does not think that (2) is true could think that (3) is true. That's a complicated statement, but it boils down to this: I shall argue that the poor lack freedom, even in the right's, and Berlin's and Rawls's, preferred sense of freedom, where freedom is identified with lack of interference, 9 I close (section 6) with a few words about the importance of the semantic tangle that Section 3 applies the section 2 argument, to, and against, a number of Berlin's formulations.
In section 4, I seek to fortify, but also to nuance, my argument, by presenting some analogies and disanalogies between the freedom conferred by money and (directly) stateregulated freedom.
In section 5, I discuss the bearing of certain Marxian theses about the difference between bourgeois and pre-bourgeois society on the widespread failure to perceive that money confers freedom and that its lack restricts it. freedom does not hold for liberty.) 10 1. The most celebrated twentieth century Anglophone political philosophers are Isaiah Berlin and John Rawls. As I have said, both reject 11 the conclusion of the right-wing argument:
Berlin was a social democrat, in the broad sense, and Rawls is a liberal, in the American sense, and, within those political positions, relief of poverty is at the top of the political agenda. Accordingly, Berlin and Rawls both deplore the right's comparative unconcern about what they would call the ability to use freedom, which, in their view, is what the poor lack.
But, in my opinion regrettably, they both fully accept the right-wing contrast between freedom and money. They agree with the right's conceptual 9 Or, strictly, with lack of interference and of liability to interference: my freedom to do A is restricted if I would be interfered with if I were to try to do A, and not merely if I am actually interfered with. I may be unfree although I suffer no actual interference, because, knowing that I am likely to be interfered with, I refrain from trying to do A. "Lack of interference" will include lack of liability to interference throughout this paper. 10 In an unpublished Addendum on "Freedom and Ability", which is available from me on demand, I discuss the relationships that obtain among freedom, means and ability. I show that the latter two have a much stronger bearing on freedom than is recognized by those against whose views this lecture is directed, and I thereby refute proposition (1): I show that freedom is compromised by lack of means.
claim, even though (not at all inconsistently) they reject the right's normative
In the following passage, Berlin shows at one and the same time agreement with the right's conceptualization of freedom conclusion.
12
It is important to discriminate between liberty and the conditions of its exercise. If a man is too poor or too ignorant or too feeble to make use of his and forthright rejection of the normative conclusion which the right build upon that conceptualization:
legal rights, the liberty that these rights confer upon him is nothing to him, but it is not thereby annihilated. The obligation to promote education, health, justice, to raise standards of living, to provide opportunity for the growth of the arts and the sciences, to prevent reactionary political or social or legal policies or arbitrary inequalities, is not made less stringent because it is not necessarily directed to the promotion of liberty itself, but to conditions in which alone its possession is of value, or to values which may be independent of it.
13
That Berlin agreed with the conceptual side of the right-wing claim is also revealed in his phrasing of a certain commendation which he offered in 1949 of the Franklin Roosevelt presidency. 14 Berlin described Roosevelt's New Deal as a "great liberal enterprise" which was "certainly the most constructive compromise between individual liberty and economic security which our own time has witnessed".
15
11 It is somewhat zeugmatic to employ the present tense with respect to Rawls and Berlin jointly, since, in its second employment, it is merely (alas) historic. I hope that the reader will forgive this infelicity, which reduces the number of sentences or clauses that I must enter to fix attributions like the one above.
12 To be sure, Berlin speaks of "liberty" rather than of "freedom", but I do not believe that this makes a substantial difference: as he later expressly said (see The First and the Last, Granta Books, London, 1999, p. 58), he used those words interchangeably, and he would certainly never have said, as his (semi-) defender Jonathan Wolff does, that what holds for liberty does not hold for freedom: see, further, the Appendix below.
13 Four Essays, p. liii, emphases added.
While I am confident that the quoted text agrees and disagrees with the right-wing view precisely as I have just claimed that it does, I do not say that Berlin's discourse in this region was consistent, or free of problems. His work on liberty was as profoundly original as it was influential, and it is common, in ground-breaking work, for distinctions to be missed and for different distinctions to be confused with one another. See fn. 32 below, for a demonstration of some relevant lapses in Berlin's text.
compromise", there was some loss of one of them, or, perhaps, of each, for the sake of the can I defend that disagreement in sections 2 through 4, but, before I do so, let me show that, like Berlin, John Rawls also accedes to the right-wing conceptualization of freedom:
conflict, but I do not agree with Berlin that, in the net effect of the New Deal, economic security was enhanced at the expense of freedom.
The inability to take advantage of one's rights and opportunities as a result of poverty and ignorance, and a lack of means generally, is sometimes counted among the constraints definitive of liberty. I shall not, however, say this, but rather I shall think of these things as affecting the worth of liberty...the worth of liberty is not the same for everyone. Some have greater authority and wealth, and therefore greater means to achieve their aims. Given the position struck in the foregoing quotation, it is curious, it seems to generate an inconsistency, that, at a later point, Rawls argues as follows for "the rule of law":
18
It is hard to see why liberty ( itself) is restricted by mere fear of its exercise yet not at all restricted by the impossibility of its exercise that (Rawls thinks) poverty ensures.
19
2. The right-wing position to which Berlin and Rawls regrettably accede says that poverty is lack of means, and that it therefore entails lack of ability rather than lack of freedom. I shall challenge that position without questioning the contrast it proposes between means and ability, on the one hand, and freedom on the other: I argue that a certain lack of freedom But this objection lacks purchase. Rawls is not saying that poverty fails to restrict political liberty, while leaving it open that it may restrict some non-political kind of liberty: nothing in his text suggests that he might countenance the relationship between poverty and nonpolitical liberty as a separate issue. There is, for example, no reason to take the "rights and opportunities" of the first sentence in the quotation from p. 204, or the "aims" of its last sentence, as, respectively, political rights and opportunities, and political aims. Rawls is referring to all the rights and opportunities, and all the aims, that obtain or come to obtain when political liberty, as he understands the latter, prevails. (Note, further, that the people with whom Rawls parts company, because they treat poverty as a constraint on liberty (itself), do not regard poverty as a constraint on political liberty alone; and poverty is, indeed, more evidently (on the view Rawls opposes) a constraint on freedom of access to goods and services than it is a constraint on political freedom proper).
accompanies lack of money, whatever the relationships among ability, means, and freedom may be, and I am happy to assume, here, with the right, and with Berlin Consider those goods and services, be they privately or publicly provided, which are not provided without charge to all comers. Some of the public ones depend on special access 1994, pp. 3-16 , which is reprinted in Jane Franklin (ed.), Equality, IPPR, London, 1997, where it is followed by a sharp reply ("Forward to Basics") by Bernard Williams, one which has not caused me to change my view.
The argument at pp.13ff below is an extended and (I hope) improved version of the argument linking money and freedom in the Appendix of "Back to Socialist Basics".
secondary school if you are forty years old). But the private ones, and many of the public ones, are inaccessible save through money: giving money is both necessary for getting them, and, indeed, sufficient for getting them, if they are on sale.
25
A property distribution just
If you attempt access to them in the absence of money, then you will be prey to interference.
is, as I have argued at length elsewhere, 26 a distribution of rights of interference. 27 If A owns P and B does not, then A may use P without interference and B will, standardly, suffer interference if he attempts to use P. But money serves, in a variety of circumstances (and, notably, when A puts P up for rent or sale), to remove that latter interference. Therefore money confers freedom, rather than merely the ability to use it, even if freedom is equated with absence of interference.
Suppose that an able-bodied woman is too poor to visit her sister in Glasgow. She cannot save enough, from week to week, to buy her way there. If she attempts to board the train, she is consequently without the means to overcome the conductor's prospective interference. Whether or not this woman should be said to have the ability to go to Glasgow, there is no deficiency in her ability to do so which restricts her independently So to lack money of the interference that she faces. She is entirely capable of boarding the underground and of traversing the space that she must cross to reach the train. But she will be physically prevented from crossing that space, or physically ejected from the train. Or consider a moneyless woman who wants to pick up, and take home, a sweater on the counter at Selfridge's. If she contrives to do so, she will be physically stopped outside Selfridge's and the sweater will be removed.
The only way you won't be prevented from getting and using things that cost money in our society -which is to say: most things -is by offering money for them.
is 25 More precisely, money is an inus condition of the said getting: see pp. 14-15 below. 26 The private property argument first appeared at pp. 27 That is a point about property in general, one that I am making as prelude to a distinct point about money, which is a very special form of property, some truths about which do not hold for property in general.
to be liable to interference, and the assimilation of money to physical, or even mental, resources is a piece of unthinking fetishism, in the good old Marxist sense that it misrepresents social relations of constraint as people lacking things (a) is true because a person may desire money other than in order to spend it.
. In a word:
money is no object.
The value of money is that it gives you freedom, and that is so even though (a) you may not want to exercise (all the) freedom in question, and (b) money alone never suffices, by itself, to supply the freedom its seekers seek. inus condition of the freedom to acquire, an insufficient but necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition. 29 But the key point is that the other conditions apply to rich and poor alike, yet the poor, as such, are far less free than the rich are, as such, because in their case the relevant inus condition is widely unsatisfied, and this makes that condition worthy of special focus. The key truth is that, if you are poor, you are pro tanto less free than if you are rich. To be sure, it is as true of the rich person as it is of the poor one that he is unfree to take the sweater without paying money: no one is free to take the sweater without paying money. But, uniquely for the poor person, this means that he is not free to take the sweater, whereas the rich person is
Things other than lack of money can prevent you from overcoming interference: things like ignorance, or stupidity, or ugliness. They constitute lack of freedom, they are free to take the sweater, by paying money for it. , the freedom that he distinguished from the ability to use it, is "opportunity for action" (p. xlii), "the absence of obstacles to possible choices and activities" (p. xxxix). And the "absence" of said "freedom is due to the closing of...doors or failure to open them, as a result, intended or unintended, of alterable human practices, of the operation of human agencies" (p. xl and cf. p. xlviii). Yet it seems evident, in contradiction of the contrast between freedom and money on which Berlin insisted, that lack of money implies lack of freedom in just that sense. The woman prevented by her poverty from travelling to
Glasgow faces just such a closed door. (Under a "smart-card" technology for controlling access to the train, that will be literally true, in a physical sense). Now, it might be claimed that I have misused a looseness in Berlin's characterization of negative freedom; that, although he several times said that it was a matter of unclosed doors, his more considered view was that it was to be understood more narrowly than that, as absurd to suppose that those who wish to resist the left-wing claim that the poor suffer an extensive lack of freedom will be content to do so by pointing out that the poor can, after all, break the law.
Berlin offers a curious prognosis regarding "those who are obsessed by the truth that negative freedom is worth little without sufficient conditions for its active exercise". He says that they "are liable to minimize its importance, to deny it the very title of freedom...and finally to forget that without it human life...withers away" (pp. lviii-lix). Or, again: "in their zeal to create social and economic conditions in which alone freedom is of genuine value, men tend to forget freedom itself" (p. liv). But how could this be so, given that, on Berlin's own reckoning, what they are obsessed by precisely are (certain forms of) valuable freedom?
Berlin's diagnosis of the supposed error of the left, namely, that they are so concerned with the ability to use freedom that they confuse it with freedom itself, is inconsistent with his prognosis that they will tend to forget that freedom itself is an essential value. Why should the left insist that freedom be capable of use if they do not, in the end, care
I believe that Berlin here misdescribes the object of his anxiety, which is rather that these champions of the poor come to care so much about the freedoms specifically associated about freedom?
31 Suppose that two people are prevented from boarding a plane, one because she lacks a passport and the other because she lacks a ticket. Was only the first unfree to board it? What the airline does to the ticketless passenger is exactly what the state does to the passportless one: block her way.
with the defeat of poverty, the freedoms associated with having money (whether one thinks, as a result 32 The alert reader will note that these are not freedoms with which the New Deal (see pp. 7-8 above) could plausibly be regarded as a compromise. But that is a further décalage in Berlin's position, and not, I am sure, a reason for claiming that my gloss on what he means here is incorrect. (Roosevelt, so Berlin surely thought, restricted property rights, yet he cannot mean to include just such rights among the "legal rights" with which he identifies "liberty itself" in the text to fn. 11 above: that would make nonsense of the (putative) contrast in that text, since being poor just means having few property rights).
There are other important lapses in Berlin's text. Consider, for example, his defence, at pp.liiiliv of the Introduction to his Four Essays, of publicly provided education. Among its recommendations, he says, is that it satisfies "the need to provide the maximum number of children with opportunities for free choice", and he presumably means to reiterate that desideratum when he speaks, a little later, of "the need to create conditions in which those who lack them will be provided with opportunities to exercise those rights (freedom to choose) which they legally possess, but cannot, without such opportunities, put to use". Now, I take it that, if you have "opportunities for free choice", you have free choice, or you have it effectively, you have it at will: all you need do, in order to have it, is take the opportunities in question. So, within the terms of the first quoted excerpt, education provides free choice itself. But that can't be what education provides according to the second excerpt, which implies that poorly educated children do have "freedom to choose", but that they lack the opportunity to exercise that freedom. (Unless, to stretch things to their limits, "legally possess" doesn't, here, entail "possess", but means "possess (merely) legally" -but then Berlin would be abandoning the distinction between (truly) having liberty and being able to use it.) Further uncertainties occur in the "Two Concepts" essay itself. Thus, at pp. 124-5, Berlin appears to conflate human desiderata (such as not starving, being clothed, etc.) that are so urgent that they are needs greater than the need for freedom with "conditions for the use of freedom", which are another matter. , fewer "obstacles to possible choices and activities" for him (p. xxxix), and that he therefore typically has more individual liberty, on Berlin's own liberty-equals-noobstacles-posed-or-left-by-others conception of liberty. Perhaps the individual liberty of already economically secure people was reduced by the New Deal, but, given his own characterisation of liberty, Berlin had no right to the conclusion, implied by his talk of "compromise" between liberty and economic security, that individual liberty as such (and not just that of members of certain classes) was reduced. 33 33 (1) I do not think the quoted characterisation of the New Deal is compatible with Berlin's later acknowledgement, at p. xlvi, that "the case for social legislation or planning, for the welfare state and socialism" can be based on considerations of liberty.
(2) It might be thought that Berlin strongly qualifies his denial that poverty represents an unfreedom when he says, at pp. 122-3 of "Two Concepts", that, consistently with the conception of freedom as non-interference, I may indeed "think myself a victim of coercion or slavery", if I hold a "theory about the causes of my poverty" according to which it is "due to the fact that other human beings ["with or without the intention of doing so"] have made arrangements whereby I am, whereas others are not, prevented from having enough money with which to pay for [things]". That theory is so weak in its claims as to be, so it seems to me, undeniable, and Berlin himself implies that it is "plausible" (p. 122). Yet Berlin, so one might infer, must deny it to sustain his claim that poverty affects not liberty but only the conditions of its exercise.
The asserted inference is, however, erroneous. The pp. 122-3 passage shows a recognition not that, as I insist, lack of money, however it may be explained, represents lack of freedom, but that lack of access to money represents lack of freedom, when it has a certain explanation (which, I have just suggested, always is its explanation).
My reading of the pp. 122-3 passage is comprehensively confirmed by a statement which appears at pp. 61-2 of The First and the Last: "A poor man….is….free to rent a room" "in an expensive hotel", "but has not the means of using this freedom. He has not the means, perhaps, because he has been prevented from earning more than he does by a man-made economic system -but that is a deprivation of freedom to earn money, not of freedom to rent the room. This may sound a pedantic distinction, but it is central to discussions of economic versus political freedom".
Money provides freedom because it extinguishes interference with access to goods
and services: it functions as an entry ticket to them. I shall now fortify, but also qualify, my argument, by comparing and contrasting money with access tickets to goods and services in a moneyless society.
Imagine, then, a society without money, in which, in the first instance, the state owns everything, and in which courses of action available to people, courses they are free to follow By hypothesis, these tickets say what a person's freedoms (and, consequently, her unfreedoms) are. But a sum of money is, in effect, a highly generalized form of such a ticket.
My statement emphasizes "in effect" because money differs from a state ticket in that, as we have seen, it is an inus condition of freedom of access to goods, rather than, as the ticket is, both necessary and sufficient for such freedom of access, in all circumstances. The effect of money for a person's freedom, is, nevertheless, in standard circumstances, exactly the same as that of owning the sort of ticket I described. A sum of money is tantamount Having drawn this analogy, I now note its limits, and, then, how modest, they are. to ( is) a license to perform a disjunction of conjunctions of actions, actions, like, for example, visiting one's sister in Glasgow, or taking home, and wearing, the sweater on the counter at Selfridge's. (As far as her freedom to go to Glasgow is concerned, the woman who is too poor to take the train is like someone whose tickets in the imagined non-monetary economy do not have "trip to Glasgow" printed on them). That money's effect is that of a freedom ticket is perhaps more clear when physical money is replaced by credit cards, or by credit accounts that have no compact physical realisation. To improve the parallel, suppose that no physical tickets are issued in the state economy, but that people's authorizations with respect to their freedom to use goods are available only on computer screens. It makes no difference to a person's freedoms whether the screen records his ticket collection or how much money he has. First, the limits, which reflect the fact, already acknowledged here, that money is an inus Whereas it is the government that restricts a person's freedom in the moneyless society, it is not, standardly, the government, but the owner of the good to which a person desires access, who, in the first instance, restricts her freedom in the money case. What the government in a money economy does is to enforce the asset-holder's will, condition of freedom. inter alia when that will is a will to deny access except in return for money. And the strategic role of the assetholder's will means both that money does not absolutely ensure access (as a state-issued freedom ticket does), and that lack of money does not absolutely ensure lack of access (as lack of a state ticket does). If Selfridge's are, for whatever reason, determined not to sell the sweater that is on display, then an offer of money will not wrest it from them. And if, contrariwise, Selfridge's are minded to give the sweater away, then the government, far from preventing the (possibly penniless) beneficiary of Selfridge's largesse from picking up the sweater gratis, will, instead, protect that gift transaction. Money is not always necessary for freedom of access to a good, since a generous seller need not demand it, and it is not always sufficient either, because the seller is not obliged to sell.
Yet the size of the indicated difference between money and state tickets should not be exaggerated. To take its proper measure, let us enter a complexity into the specification of the state ticket society that matches, to a certain required extent, the complexity in monetary economies exposed above. 34 Imagine, then, that, like money, the state tickets are neither always necessary nor always sufficient to secure goods, because state-appointed asset administrators are free, to some small extent, to grant access to ticketless people and to withhold it from people with tickets: this is an officially recognized perk of office. The administrators, let us further suppose, exercise bias in favour of some citizens and against others to precisely the same extent that private asset holders do in the money economy. So, in parallel with the complexity in the money society noted above, tickets no longer absolutely ensure access and ticketlessness no longer absolutely ensures non-access, in the non-money economy. But it remains true that the ticket distribution strongly affects freedom; tickets establish what you are free and not free to do, not, now, to be sure, as we originally supposed, tout court, but within the feasible set established by asset administrators' spheres of discretion, and their particular intentions. And the size of those spheres of discretion enables us to say that freedom of access is largely Now, private asset holders have full discretion over their holdings, established by tickets, in the revised state economy. 35 social power in the form of a thing" 40 , but it is not, like a screwdriver or a cigarette lighter, itself 38 Note that,when private asset holders are forbidden not to sell to whoever has the money to buy what they offer for sale, then money becomes more like a ticket in the first form of ticket economy (the one without administrators' discretion) precisely because there's a certain guarantee of civil rights: you can't, now, discriminate oppressively.
39 See footnote 38 above. 40 Marx's statement appears in this passage, which I have discussed at pp. 124-5 of my Karl Marx's Theory of History: "The less social power the medium of exchange possesses ... the greater must be the power of the community which binds the individuals together, the patriarchal relation, the community of antiquity, feudalism and the gild system. [In market society] each individual possesses social power in the form of a thing. Rob the thing of this social power and you must give it to persons to exercise over persons." (The Grundrisse, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1973, pp. 157-8) .
a thing (meaning, here, by a "thing", a physical object), for social power is not a thing. If you swap your ten one-pound coins for a ten-pound note, you've got a different thing from what you had before, but the very same money. You've got the same license to travel, to acquire goods and services and so on, the same social entitlement, the same prospects of noninterference that you had before (or nearly the same: the bus conductor who is happy to accept your pound-coin may refuse to change your ten-pound note, and kick you off the bus).
Money is a social power in a sense in which muscles, for example, are not. What you can do with your muscles depends, of course, on social rules and on socially created material structures -such as roads and doors and staircases. But money (as opposed to gold) is not something material, like muscles (and gold), whose practical significance society affects, but social in its very essence. Money doesn't even have to be three-dimensionally embodied: it can take the form of entries on a computer (see section 2 above), and it could, in principle, be less material still. If people all had wonderful memories and were all law-abiding, and information flowed rapidly from person to person, money could take the form of nothing more than common knowledge of people's entitlements. 41 The raison d'être
Notice that I have not claimed that either economy is more attractive than the other.
Many will prefer the private property money economy in which my freedom does not depend so immediately on the state, but on the decisions of other people that the state endorses.
of money is to overcome the interference in access to goods that prevails when money is not forthcoming:
that is not true of, for example, muscles, even though big ones may provide access to goods when social order breaks down.
That the tickets establish a social structuring of freedom is manifest in the state economy. My claim is that money does so quite as much in the private property economy, albeit less manifestly, since a five-pound-note, unlike an equivalent ticket, does not actually have the freedoms that it confers written on it. One purpose of the present lecture is to make it manifest that money confers freedom quite as much as such a ticket does. It is only deficits in knowledge and in cognitive capacity that disable me from knowing what freedoms a fivepound note represents. Minds more powerful than ours could look at such a note and say what disjunction of conjunctions of actions it frees us to perform. London, 1995, p. 35 ) that "money must come in some physical form or other", unless, what I doubt, he was resting it on limitations in human cognitive and/or moral powers. (Note that even if mental states are brain (and, therefore, physical) states, money does not take the form of brain states in the fantasy sketched in the sentence to which this footnote is attached).
42 Capitalist economies are often thought superior to state-controlled economies, from the point of view of freedom, just in that there is a wider dispersion of property in the former. But, by that token, a market socialist society, with far wider dispersion of property, and, consequently, of the freedom that goes with it, is even better. To be sure, there is much more to be said on both sides of this argument: these are just prima facie considerations. But, for balance, I enter the pro-market-socialist anti-capitalist point, which deserves to be set beside the wearisomely familiar pro-capitalist anti-state-control point.
But that does not touch the present point, which is that what depends on those decisions in the money economy precisely is my freedom.
43
The message, then, is that the left's protest against poverty is 44 a plea on behalf of freedom, and, more particularly, a protest against the extreme unfreedom of the poor in capitalist society, and in favour of a much more equal distribution of freedom.
45
Some who have heard this paper make the correct point that it does not prove that the right must abandon their political preferences, since they can always reformulate them without using the language of freedom. That is indeed so, but the right lose, if my line is sound, not, indeed, the capacity to stick to the policies that they favour, but an 6. The arguments and the conclusions of this article are conceptual in character. No normative claim has been defended, or even asserted, although I have allowed myself to deliver certain conceptual claims in a distinctly normative tone of voice.
Some people respond to such work by complaining that, in virtue of its purely conceptual character, it establishes no normative conclusions. Why, then, they ask, is it important?
The answer is that conceptual claims are sometimes key premisses in arguments with normative conclusions, and the right-wing movement from (1) through to (5) is a case in point. That important normative argument is defeated when its critical conceptual sub conclusion, (3), is shown to be false, as it has been here. And this way of countering normative arguments is often more effective than a properly normative confrontation with them, which so often leads to impasse.
argument for those policies rooted in the value of freedom. The counter-argument that I have provided will not detach hard-core "libertarians" from their political position, but that is precisely because, despite their rhetoric, they do not care about liberty or freedom as such. 46 43 It is perhaps curious that, whereas liberals regard distribution through money as liberating, by contrast with distribution through status, or political power, they are nevertheless concerned to deny, as we have seen, that money is a form of freedom. 44 Contrary to what Berlin says in texts presented at pp. 6 and 16 above. 45 I believe that H. L. A. Hart was mistaken when he spoke of "the Marxists whose identification of poverty with lack of freedom confuses two different evils" ("Are There Any Natural Rights?", in Jeremy Waldron, (ed.), Theories of Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984, p. 77, emphasis in original) . A contrast between poverty and lack of freedom follows from stipulative restrictions on the uses of "freedom" and "liberty" which Hart introduces in the relevant paragraph, and which nicely suit his perfectly legitimate intellectual purposes. But he had no good reason to apply those restrictions against Marxist uses of the contested terms.
46 I do not doubt that they believe that they care about freedom, but that is because they confuse freedom with self-ownership: see my Freedom, and Equality,  But others, who are not hard-core and Chapter 10.
"libertarians", do care about liberty, and are attracted to the right-wing position because it appears to have liberty on its side. It is those "floating voters", rather than either the committed left or the committed right, who represent the constituency whose political opinion is most likely to be affected by this paper.
Let me now offer some more general remarks about the right's attitude to interference, not, now, in relation to money in particular, but in relation to private property in general.
The right profess to be hostile to interference, as such, but they do not really oppose interference as such. They oppose interference with the rights of private property, but they support interference with access by the poor to that same private property, and they consequently cannot defend property rights by invoking the value of freedom, in the sense of non-interference. 47 They cannot, on the basis of a principled aversion to interference, defend private property against the grievance that poverty represents by recourse to the familiar tactic that I have sought to discredit here.
Some readers may be perplexed, and some incensed, by what they may think to be a strange, or even a brazen, assimilation of illegal interference with private property (such as trespass) and legally justified Philosophers have construed the words "freedom", "free", and so forth in two contrasting ways. As some, including the present author, construe them, one may say that A is To see where the real discussion must be situated, return to the point made in fn. n, that the airline company withholds freedom from the ticketless aspiring traveller no less than the government does from the passportless aspiring traveller. There is no reason to modify or qualify that judgment, but there is nevertheless a difference between state-originating and business-originating preventions, which a soberly circumstantial assessment of capitalism and freedom must observe. And the difference is that when the government grants freedom to travel to A, there is no B who loses a significant freedom as a result: the distribution of passports is not the distribution of a scarce good. When the government provides a passport, it removes a barrier to one person other than at the cost of erecting one for another.
In effect if not in intention, the argument criticized in the present paper illicitly shortcircuits complex empirical questions. It is altogether too swift, and it discredits the defenders of the capitalist market who use it. But its very weakness restricts the size of the victory that its defeat represents for critics of market capitalism, since it is an unlikely supposition that nothing more than what the argument says can be said on behalf of a connection between market capitalism and freedom.
49 I imply that it is not acceptable when I say, above, that it violates ordinary language, but the issue of its acceptability, on that or any other basis, is entirely incidental here: Cf. SelfOwnership, Chapter 2, section 3e. 50 There is also an argument, favoured by the right, and articulated by Jan Narveson in his "Libertarianism vs. Marxism: Reflections on G. A. Cohen's Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality" (The Journal of Ethics, Volume 2, No. 1, 1998, pp. 3ff.), according to which the regime of private property may be defended not as constituting a realm of freedom but as resulting from exercises of freedom in a pre-private-property state of nature. I refute that argument in my "Once More into the Breach of Self-Ownership", which shows, at pp. 60-7, that it fails to consider the unfreedom suffered by non-appropriators of private property.
What holds for the government and the traveller vis-à-vis passports contrasts, thereby, with what holds for the airline company (be it privately owned or not) and the traveller vis-à-vis tickets. Airplane seats being in finite supply, providing a seat to one person means not providing a seat to countless other persons. Or, if everyone is crazy about flying, then providing seats for all means nevertheless denying freedom of access to other goods for them, because of finite overall resources. This does not make it false that the person who cannot afford a ticket lacks a freedom. But it does mean that partisans of freedom cannot propose the abolition of airline tickets in the way that they might propose abolition of passports.
So the real issue, which is illicitly circumvented by the right-wing argument, and as was suggested in the fourth paragraph of section 2 above, is how freedom is to be distributed where resource finitude makes limitations on freedom unavoidable. The claim that, in the face of resource finitude, market capitalism is optimal for freedom, has not been proved. But the case against that claim is not made by the defeat of the short-circuiting argument that has been refuted here.
In "Freedom, Liberty, and Property", to go into that here, and anyway, it isn't the most important question.
Jonathan Wolff proposes that both left and right overreach themselves in the claims that they lodge regarding freedom and/or liberty. To a first approximation, so he contends, the left is right about freedom but wrong about liberty, while the right is right about liberty but wrong about freedom. That is merely to a first approximation, however, since "freedom" and "liberty", in ordinary usage, do not always comply with the partly stipulative definitions of those terms that Wolff offers in pursuit of his claim. For his clarifying purposes, "freedom" may be understood as "real possibility", while "liberty" may be understood as "permissibility". The left is interested in real possibility, and correctly denies that permissibility delivers it. The right is interested in permissibility, and correctly denies that it entails real possibility. These denials are logically equivalent, so left and right are right about the same thing. But the left is wrong when it assimilates everything important that can be meant by "liberty" to its plausible conception of freedom as real possibility. And the right is wrong when it assimilates everything important that can be meant by "freedom" to its plausible conception of liberty as permissibility. further, that I lack and always will lack the money to do so. I would nevertheless consider it an insult if I were forbidden by a state to travel to Australia (whether it be by Canada or by Australia -though the insults might be of different significance and/or weight in the two cases). Accordingly, my Wolffian liberty to travel to Australia matters to me independently of whether or not I am Wolffianly free to do so. If I were free to do so, through, for example, undetectable passport fraud, I might nevertheless regret that what I was thereby free to do was something that I was not (officially) at liberty to do. ("Officially" needs to be added because of the discrepancy between Wolff's definition of "liberty" and its use in ordinary discourse.
Someone might say: despite the state prohibition, you are at liberty to travel to Australia, since I can forge a visa for you).
So the real reason for caring about liberty when no freedom goes with it is that lack of liberty then (still) means an insult to my dignity, a diminution of my status. But that has nothing to do with caring about freedom, as such. (It has to do, instead, with caring about who presumes to restrict my freedom, and why they seek to do so.)
So why is it worse for the state to forbid me access to, say, Glasgow, than for the railway company to do so? Because the former involves a judgment on my status, and the latter doesn't. That is why state-legislated impermissibility matters distinctively to me, whether or not it removes my freedom. When the state forbids me to do something that it should forbid no one to do, it seeks to make me unfree in a respect in which no one need be unfree. And it thereby insults my status, in a way that a business that will not give its wares to me gratis 54 We naturally say, "the escaped convicts are still at liberty": that contradicts Wolff's stipulations.
does not.
